A Theory of Sequential Group Reciprocity by Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro T. & Mosiño, Alejandro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Theory of Sequential Group
Reciprocity
Alejandro T. Moreno-Okuno and Alejandro Mosin˜o
University of Guanajuato
19 February 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76820/
MPRA Paper No. 76820, posted 21 February 2017 02:44 UTC
A Theory of Sequential Group Reciprocity
Alejandro T. Moreno-Okuno Alejandro Mosiño
February 19, 2017
Abstract
Games that appear to be independent, involving none of the same
players, may be related by emotions of reciprocity between the members
of the same groups. In the real world, individuals are members of groups
and want to reward or punish those groups whose members have been kind
or unkind to members of their own. In this paper we extend Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteigers model of sequential reciprocity (2004) to groups of in-
dividuals and dene a new sequential group reciprocity equilibriumfor
which we prove its existence. We study the case of two games with two
players in each game, where each player belongs to the same group as a
player in the other game. We show that when the payo¤s of one game are
much higher than the payo¤s of the other, the outcome of the game with
higher payo¤s determines the outcome of the other game. We also nd
that when the payo¤s are very asymmetric, the outcome where the sum
of the payo¤s is maximized is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium.
Fairness, Groups, Psychological Games, Game Theory
JEL: A12, D63, C70
1 Introduction
It is normally assumed that players do not care about the outcomes of games
in which they are not involved.1 However, in the real world individuals form
emotions of fairness based on the treatment of others and these emotions can
a¤ect the outcome of their own games. For example, a mother may be nicer
to someone who is nice to her daughter. And in countless interethnic conicts
individuals from each of the groups involved have targeted innocent members
of the other group in order to avenge previous o¤enses. Less tragically, indi-
viduals sometimes buy products at a higher price or of subpar quality solely
because those products come from rms owned by their fellow countrymen or
by members of their own ethnic group.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the outcome of
seemingly independent games (those games in which the players of one game are
di¤erent to the players of the others), stemming from the emotions of fairness
and reciprocity.
1Some exceptions are Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Engelmann and Fischbacher (2008).
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In his seminal paper, Matthew Rabin (1993) introduced fairness to game
theory by modeling how if one player believes that her opponent is sacricing
their own material payo¤s to help her, then she may be willing to sacrice her
own material payo¤s as well in order to help her opponent in return; and if one
player believes that her opponent is treating her badly, she may sacrice her
own material payo¤ to treat her opponent badly. As an example, Rabin shows
how in the PrisonersDilemma this allows for a Fairness Equilibrium, (FE
from now on) in which both players play cooperate. Rabins model is dened
for two players in static games.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabins model to dynamic games
for more players with their solution concept of Sequential Reciprocity Equilib-
rium (SRE from now on). We extend Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)s
model of reciprocity, in which individuals want to reciprocate the kindness or
unkindness of other individuals, to a more comprehensive model that incorpo-
rates a sense of fairness that depends on the payo¤s of other members of our own
groups. Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have developed other models of reciprocity.
However, we focus in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteigers model, given that we be-
lieve their approach of reciprocity based on intentions is essential to represent
the idea of group reciprocity.
The contribution of this article is to extend the concept of reciprocity with
the following three stylized facts:
1) individuals want to increase the material payo¤s of those individuals that
belong to the same groups as them and are willing to sacrice their own material
payo¤s in order to do it.
2) individuals treat more kindly those individuals that have been kind to
other individuals that are close to them and individuals treat more unkindly
those individuals that have been kind to other individuals that are close to
them.
3) the acts of kindness or unkindness of some members of a group can create
sympathy or resentment towards all the members of their group and a desire for
reciprocity towards each of these, even those that played no part in the original
acts.
We develop a game theoretic framework that incorporates these facts. In
section 2, we present evidence that support the stylized facts of our model. We
review both empirical and experimental evidence.
In section 3.1, we introduce our model by extending Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004)s model of sequential reciprocity to groups of individuals. We
dene a utility function that represents all three stylized facts mentioned above
and dene a new solution concept which we call Sequential Group Reciprocity
Equilibria.
In Section 3.2 we probe the existence of our solution concept in Theorem 1.
Although the proof is in Appendix I, we give a brief explanation of the proof.
In Section 3.3.1 we mention the di¤erences between our model and the FE and
SRE.
In Section 3.3 we develop an example to show the relation that the outcome
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of one game has over the outcome of other games, due to emotions of group
reciprocity. In order to show the interaction between groups of individuals we
work with the easiest case: two games of two players and two groups with two
members. One of the members of each group play in each game. We get the
following basic results:
First, as the material payo¤s of one game grow arbitrarily large, the outcome
of that game dominates the emotions of reciprocity of the players that play in
the other game. In the Sequential Group Reciprocity Equilibria, if the outcome
of the game with arbitrarily large payo¤s is positive and both players are kind,
the emotions of the players in the other game are going to be positive and
they will be kind also in their own game. In the Sequential Group Reciprocity
Equilibria, if the outcome of the game with arbitrarily large payo¤s is negative
and both players are unkind, the emotions of the players in the other game are
going to be negative and they will be unkind also in their own game .
Second, in the Sequential Group Reciprocity Equilibria, when the material
payo¤s of one game become arbitrarily small the sign of outcome of that game
is the same as the sign of the outcome of the other game: players in the game in
which payo¤s are small are kind only if players in the other game are kind and
unkind if players in the other game are unkind. These two results are based on
the same idea. If the stakes in one game are much higher in one game in relation
to the other, the outcome of that game is going to dominate the emotions of
the players also in other games.
Third, if the material payo¤s of both games are su¢ ciently asymmetric (i.e.,
individuals can greatly reward or punish their opposing players with little cost to
themselves), the outcome in which the sum of the material payo¤s is maximized
is a Sequential Group Reciprocity Equilibrium. This result is very optimistic
as it concludes that in the outcome where the sum of the material payo¤s is
being maximized, nobody wants to deviate (even if they can increase their own
material payo¤s by doing it). The reason is that in this case, the emotional
payo¤s is positive, in fact very positive, and even the players that can increase
their material payo¤s by deviating, prefer to maximize their emotional payo¤s
instead and being kind (as their partners are being treated nice, in fact, very
nice).
Fourth, in the case where one game is played rst and then the other, and the
material payo¤s of the games are asymmetric enough, we nd that the Sequential
Group Reciprocity Equilibrium is that in which the outcome in which the sum
of the material payo¤s of the players is maximized. The reason for this is that
the player in the rst period than can be very kind or unkind, wants to be nice
to her opposite in order for her own partner to be treated nicely in the second
period.
Finally, in section 4 we conclude and discuss possible extensions.
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2 Evidence
There is evidence that individuals often treat better other members of their own
groups. Tajfel et al. (1971) show that individuals favor members of their own
group when distributing rewards and penalties in situations in which irrelevant
classications distinguished between the in-group and the out-group. Ayres and
Siegelman (1995) show that black buyers of new cars are o¤ered higher prices
than white buyers in dealerships in the Chicago-area. Zussman (2013) nds
that Arab buyers and sellers in the Israeli online market for used cars are dis-
criminated against. Price and Wolfers (2010) nd that referees in the NBA
award more personal fouls to players of their opposite race. Chen and Li (2009)
show that individuals are not only more altruistic, but they have also less envy
towards members of their own groups and when matched with in-group mem-
bers, are more likely to choose social welfare maximization outcomes. Mitchell
et al. (2005) shows that mock jurors tend to decide in favor of individuals that
share their ethnicity and were more likely to give longer sentences for other race
defendants.
Additionally, there is evidence that individuals evaluate the kindness of a
person, taking into consideration how that person has treated other individuals,
specially those that are close to them. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Engelmann
and Fischbacher (2008), Nowak and Sigmund (1998), and Nowak and Sigmund
(2005) show that individuals want to help/punish those individuals that are
kind/unkind towards other individuals. Goette et al. (2006) show that individ-
uals that were being trained in di¤erent platoons in the Swiss Army had higher
levels of cooperation and had expected more cooperation from members of the
same platoon and when they were given the opportunity to punish defection of
third parties punished more harshly if the defection a¤ected a member of their
own platoon.
Finally, there is evidence that the kindness or unkindness of individuals
creates sympathy or resentment towards all the members of their group and a
desire for reciprocity towards them, even those that played no part in the original
acts. Hugh-Jones and Leroch (2010, 2011) show experimentally that individuals
that were harmed by an individual reacted by harming other member of that
individuals group. Shayo and Zussman (2011) nd that judges in Israel treat
more favorable members of their own ethnic groups, and this bias increases after
a terrorist attack in the vicinity of the court. Edwards et al. (2007) show that
consumers in New Zeland and Australia reacted to the French Nuclear Test in
the south pacic in the mid-1990s rms by reducing their consumption from
French rms. Michaels and Zhi (2010) nd that American rmswillingness to
pay for French inputs decreased after France did not support American e¤orts
to obtain UN Security Council mandate to use military force against Iraq and
American imports from France could have being reduced for this reason for as
much as 15%.
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3 Model
Our model is dened for dynamic games with perfect information. Ai is the set
of strategies (possible mixed) for player i and A =
Q
i2N
Ai is the set of strategy
proles for all players: ai 2 Ai is a strategy for individual i, bij 2 Ai are the
beliefs of individual i regarding the strategy of individual j and cijk 2 Ai are
the beliefs of individual i about the beliefs of the individual j about the strategy
of player k (second order beliefs). Strategy ai(h) is the same as strategy ai, but
playing history h with probability one. i : A! R are individual is material
payo¤s. H is the set of the histories of the game and N is the set of the players
in the game.
Let Si be a partition of N: Partition Si represents the di¤erent groups a
player can belong according to player i. By allowing for di¤erent partitions for
di¤erent players we are allowing for each player to have di¤erent beliefs of what
the groups are. For example, conceivable, it can happen that a player believes
to belong to a group, while others players do not believe it.
We rst dene what an equitable payo¤ is and use it as a reference point to
evaluate the kindness of a strategy. We only look for the equitable payo¤s in
the set of e¢ cient strategies. A payo¤ that is not e¢ cient cannot be equitable,
given that the player is giving a lower payo¤ to the opposing player without
any benet to herself. We dene a players strategy as e¢ cient if there is no
other strategy that always gives every player a higher or equal payo¤, with strict
inequality for at least one player. Because we require that at the equilibria all
players maximize at every history, we dene our concepts at every history of
the game.
Ei =
fai 2 Ai j there exists no a0i 2 Ai such that for all h 2 H; (aj)j 6=i 2
Q
j 6=i
Aj
and m 2 N; we have that m(a0i(h); (aj(h))j 6=i)  m(ai(h); (aj(h))j 6=i);
with strict inequality for at least one (h; (aj)j 6=i;m)g
Ei is the set of strategies for player i that cannot improve any player at any
history without making another player worst o¤. As the FE and the SRE we
dene the equitable payo¤ as the average of the highest and the lowest of the
payo¤s in the set of the e¢ cient strategies.
Denition 1: the equitable payo¤ for individual j at history h is given
by the following equation:
ej((am(h))m6=i) =
1
2

max fj(ai(h); (am(h))m6=i) j ai 2 Aig
+min fj(ai(h); (aim(h))m6=i) j ai 2 Eig

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We use the equitable payo¤ as a reference point to evaluate the kindness of a
strategy. We propose that a strategy that provides an opponent a higher payo¤
than the equitable payo¤ be evaluated as kind and a strategy that provides an
opponent with a lower payo¤ than the equitable payo¤ be evaluated as unkind.
The following function represents how kind an individual believes she is to her
opponent.
Denition 2: the kindness of player i towards player j when playing strat-
egy ai is given by:
fij (ai(h); (bim(h))m6=i) = j (ai(h); (bim(h))m6=i)  ej((bim(h))m6=i)
We refer to fij as the kindness function. We would evaluate the strategy
of player i as kind if the kindness function is positive, as the kindness function
of player i is positive only when she is sacricing her own material payo¤s to
increase the material payo¤s of player j. The more positive the kindness function
is, the higher the material payo¤ player i is giving to player j and the kinder
we would evaluate player i to be. We would evaluate the strategy of player i
as unkind if the kindness function is negative as the kindness function of player
i is negative only when she is sacricing her own material payo¤s to decrease
the material payo¤s of player j. The more negative the kindness function is,
the lower the material payo¤ player i is giving to player j and the unkinder we
would evaluate player i to be.
Now we dene a function that represents how kind a player considers other
players behave with their opponents.
Denition 3: player is beliefs about how kind player j is with another
player k when she believes she is playing strategy bij is given by:
efijk (bij(h); (cij`(h))` 6=j) = k (bij(h); (cij`(h))` 6=j)  ek((cij`(h))` 6=j)
efijk is similar to fij but is based on second and third order beliefs. For
notational simplicity, we will refer to fij (ai(h); (bim(h))m6=i) as fij ,efijk (bij(h); (cij`(h))` 6=j) as efijk and j (ai(h); (bim(h))m6=i) as i:
Once we have completed the denitions of kindness and belief as regards
kindness we can dene an individuals utility function.
Denition 4: The utility of individual i that belongs to group P 2 Si is
given by:
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Ui = i + i
P
k2Pni
k   i
P
Q2Si
 Pj2Q(fij   efiji) + i Pj2Q Pk2Pni( efijk   efikj)

i 2 [0; 1] represents how much player i cares about the other members of
her group. At the extremes, if i = 1 player i cares as much about the members
of her group as she does about herself and if i = 0 player i does not care at all
about the other members of her group. i is the importance player i gives to
reciprocity considerations.
The rst term of the utility function: i represents the material payo¤s of
player i. The second term: i
P
k2Pni
k is the sum of the material payo¤s of the
players (other than i) that belong to the same group as player i: This term is
multiplied by i; which is positive, but equal or lower than one to represent that
an individual cares about the payo¤s of other members of her group, but (most
of the times) not as much as she cares about her own payo¤s. From now on, I
will refer to the rst two terms of the utility function as the material payo¤s.
The absolute value represents the emotion of reciprocity. Inside the ab-
solute value, there are two terms. The rst term:
P
j2Q
(fij   efiji) represents the
direct reciprocity between i and the members of group Q. The second term:
i
P
j2Q
P
k2Pni
( efijk  efikj) represents the addition of all the kindness functions be-
tween the members of the group of player i and the members of group Q. By
allowing for the same players with who player i is directly playing to be in this
term, we are including the emotion of indirect reciprocity (indirect reciprocity
is the emotion of caring not only for how somebody treats us, but how he treats
other individuals.) However, to avoid further complexity, we limit the emotion
of indirect reciprocity to the cases where at least one of the players belong to
the same group as player i: By including both terms inside the absolute value,
we are representing what we call group reciprocity, that when we play with
an individual we not only care about how that player treat us, but how other
members of her group treat other members of our own group. From now on, I
will refer to this part of the utility function as the reciprocal payo¤s.
This utility function has four main features. The rst one is that the utility
of a player increases as the material payo¤s of the other members of her group
increases. The second one is that the utility of a player increases when she is
kind to somebody that is kind to her and when she is unkind to somebody that
is unkind to her. The third one is that the utility of a player increases when she
is kind to somebody that is kind to a third individual and when she is unkind
to somebody that is unkind to a third individual (as long as she belong to her
group). Finally, a the utility of a player increases when she is kind to somebody
that belongs to a group where one member has been kind to a member of her
own group and when she is unkind to somebody that belongs to a group where
a member has been unkind to a member of her own group.
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We use this utility function to dene a new equilibrium concept that in-
corporates the idea that players want to reciprocate when playing against the
members of a group in which somebody has been kind or unkind to somebody in
their group. We name this equilibrium as Sequential Group-Reciprocity Equi-
librium. As in Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004), in equilibrium, an individuals beliefs have to match both
their beliefs regarding beliefs and their actual strategies.
Denition 5 The strategy prole a 2 A is a Sequential Group Reciprocity
Equilibrium if for every i; j; k 2 N; where j 6= i; k 6= j; and for every h 2 H it
holds the following:
1) ai 2 argmaxa0i(h)2Ai(h) Ui(a0i(h); ((bik(h))k 6=i; (cijk)k 6=i;j)i 6=j)
2) bij = aj
cijk = ak
From now on, we will refer to the Sequential Group Reciprocity Equilibrium
as SGRE. The model captures the idea that in the face of acts of kindness or
unkindness committed by others, individuals may want to reciprocate not only
to those who committed the acts, but also to all of the members of the same
group. As a result, the outcomes of di¤erent games for individuals that belong
to the same groups may be related.
3.1 Existence
The FE evaluates the kindness of a player towards another player (for clarity we
will refer to both players as giverand receiver) as a function of the payo¤s
the receiver gets. Because the payo¤s of the receiver depend not only on the
actions of the giver, but also on her own actions, the FE assumes that a player
(spectator), who can be the giver or the receiver, evaluates the kindness based
on the payo¤s the spectator believes the giver wants to give to the receiver. For
this, Rabin assumes that the spectator has beliefs not only about the actions
of the receiver, but also about the beliefs the giver has about the actions of
the receiver). The SRE extends the concept of reciprocity for more players, by
assuming that the spectator has beliefs about the actions of all other players
and about the beliefs of the giver.
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) showed that extending the concept of
reciprocity for dynamic games does not allow for a proof of existence using
backward induction, given that the best action of each player at each history
not only depends on the strategy of the other players, but also on the actions
of the same player at other histories. For example, in the PrisonersDilemma,
shown in gure 1 the utility of player 2 at history D, depends not only on the
strategy of player 1, but also on her own action at history C.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger prove instead the existence of the SRE by
maximizing each players utility at every history in which they play, given not
only the strategies of the other players, but also their own actions at other
histories. They form a correspondence from the union of the best replies of
every player at every history and apply Kakutanis xed point theorem to prove
that this correspondence has a xed point. This is an equilibrium as no player
can improve at any particular history by changing their actions on that history.
Theorem: Every nite extensive game with perfect information has a
Group Fairness Equilibrium.
The proof of theorem 1 is in the Appendix.
Our proof of existence follows Dufwenberg and Kirchsteigers (2004) proof
of existence of their concept of Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium by proving
that there is a Sequential Group-Reciprocity equilibrium where players maxi-
mize their utility at every history simultaneously using Kakutanis xed point
theorem.
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3.1.1 Di¤erences with the FE and the SRE.
There are a few di¤erences between our solution concept and the FE and the
SRE.
1) The rst di¤erence is that our solution concept includes the concept of
SRE, but extends it for reciprocity between the members of di¤erent groups.
The rst term inside the absolute value in our utility function is the equivalent
to the utility function used in the SRE. It is in the second term where our
concept di¤ers from the SRE by including the emotion of reciprocity for the
treatment of other members of our own groups. If, for example, i = 0; our
solution concept is equivalent to the SRE.
2) The second di¤erence is that our solution concept includes an absolute
value instead of the multiplication of the fairness functions, as the FE and the
SRE do. The reason for this is that we want to represent that players want to
reciprocate a kind or unkind act with the same intensity. The FE and the SRE
assume instead that players want to reciprocity a small o¤ense with the highest
possible punishment.
3) As the SRE we do not normalize the reciprocity part of the utility function
as the FE does. We do this for simplicity, as our utility function is complicate as
it is now. This also allow us to prove the existence of our solution concept, as our
utility function is continuos. (The utility function of the FE is discontinuous,
and therefore it cannot be proved its existence.)
4) Unlike the FE and the SRE, we include the material payo¤s of the other
members of the group of each player in the utility function. This allow us to
represent that individuals not only want to reciprocate against kind or unkind
acts against members of their groups, but they have the emotion of altruism,
especially with members of their own group.
3.2 Basic Results
While most economists have assumed that players only care about what happens
in the games they play, our model assumes that players take into consideration
also the interaction of players in other games if they belong to their groups. Our
aim is to model how the outcome in one game may a¤ect the outcome of other
games.
In this section we analyze the case of two games with two players in each
game and two groups with two members in each group. One of the members of
each group plays in each game. To be concise, we will refer to the other member
of an individuals own group as her partnerand the person an individual is
playing against as her opponent.
We analyze the relationship that exists between the outcomes of two seem-
ingly independent games. As Rabin (1993), we study games where the material
payo¤s may be arbitrarily small or arbitrarily large. For this, we consider a
set of games that are exactly the same, with the exception of the scale of their
material payo¤s. Let G be the set of games that consists of the set of players
N , where N = f1; 2; 3; 4g; the set of strategies Ai for all i 2 N , and the payo¤
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functions X  i (a1; a2) where i = 1; 2 and Y  k (a3; a4) where k = 3; 4 for
X > 0; Y > 0. Let G(X;Y ) 2 G be the game that corresponds to the given
values X and Y .
Given that the material payo¤s for each player depend solely on his or her
own strategies and those of their opponents, we can think of each game G(X;Y )
as a game composed of two materially independent games, one made up of
players 1 and 2 and the other made up of players 3 and 4. Let G1 be the set of
games that consists of players 1 and 2 and strategies A1 and A2, and material
payo¤s X  1 (a1; a2) and X  2 (a2; a1)). Let G1 (X) 2 G1 be the game that
corresponds to a given value of X. Let G2 be the set of games that consists of the
set of players 3 and 4, the set of strategies A3 and A4, and the payo¤ functions
Y  3 (a3; a4) and Y  4 (a4; a3) : Let G2 (Y ) 2 G2 be the game corresponding
to a given value of Y .
Given that a game G(X;Y ) is composed of games G1(X) and G2(Y ), we
sometimes refer to G(X;Y ) as the composite game,to G1(X) as single game
1, and to G2(Y ) as single game 2.We refer to the set of players of single
game 1 as N1 and to the set of players of single game 2 as N2:
Our intention is to identify the outcomes where all players are being kind
or unkind. To do so, we rewrite one of Rabins denitions. Rabin (1993) works
with a single game, hence his denitions are for a single game only. Rabin
denes the outcome of a game as a function of the sign of the kindness function
of both players. The outcome of a game is positive if both players are kind to
each other and negative if both players are unkind to each other.
Denition 6 For a single game m: a) an outcome is strictly positive if for
all i; j 2 Nm; j 6= i; we have fij > 0; b) an outcome is weakly positive if for all
i; j 2 Nm; j 6= i; we have fij  0; c) an outcome is strictly negative if for all
i; j 2 Nm; j 6= i; we have fij < 0 and d) an outcome is weakly negative if for
all i; j 2 Nm; j 6= i; we have fij  0:
For some results we want to allow individuals to be nice to each other if
they choose to be. However, this is not possible in every game. For example,
in the Battle of the Sexes an individual cannot be kind to his or her opponent,
given that when a person maximizes their opponents material payo¤s, they are
maximizing their own material payo¤s as well. We dene a game where all
individuals can be kind in every possible situation as a kind-game.
Denition 7 A kind-game is a game where hi (ai)   li(ai) > 0 for every
ai 2 Ai and for every i 2 N .
A kind-game is a game where all players always have the possibility of being
nice to their opponents, as in the PrisonersDilemma. This denition excludes
games such as the Battle of the Sexes, where players do not make any sacrice
when they maximize their opponents material payo¤s.
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Player 2 (Daughter of family 2)
Player 1 (Daughter of family 1)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4X; 4X 0; 6X
Defect 6X; 0 X;X
Game 1 G1(X)
Player 4 (Mother of family 2)
Player 3 (Mother of family 1)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4Y; 4Y 0; 6Y
Defect 6Y; 0 Y; Y
Game 2 G2(Y )
Example 1
In the next two propositions we analyze the properties of the sequential group
reciprocity equilibria when the material payo¤s of a single game change while
the material payo¤s for the other single game remain the same. In Proposition
1, we analyze the case where Y grows arbitrarily large while X remains constant
and in Proposition 2, we analyze the case where Y is small relative to X.
PROPOSITION 1: If i > 0 and i > 0 for every i 2 N and G(X;Y ) is
a kind-game, there exists a Y for which for all Y > Y in the sequential group
reciprocity equilibria of G(X;Y ) if the sign of the outcome for G2(Y ) is strictly
positive then the sign of the outcome for G1(X) is strictly positive and if the
sign of the outcome for G2(Y ) is strictly negative then the sign of the outcome
for G1(X) is strictly negative.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
When the material payo¤s of single game 2 grow with respect to those of
single game 1, its fairness considerations dominate those of single game 1 if
players care at least to some degree about how their partners are treated. If the
outcome of single game 2 is strictly negative, the emotions of fairness of every
player will be strictly negative and no player would sacrice their own material
payo¤s to be nice to their opponent, which would eliminate any strictly positive
outcome for game 1 also.
In example 2, if Y is large enough with respect to X and if the outcome in
single game 2 is (defect, defect), which is a strictly negative outcome, then the
fairness considerations of single game 2 dominate those of single game 1, thus
eliminating any positive or neutral sequential group reciprocity equilibrium for
the composite game and any positive outcome for single game 1. As the material
payo¤s of single game 2 grow arbitrarily large, the only outcome for single game
1 in the fairness equilibrium is (defect, defect).
In example 2, as Y becomes arbitrarily small, individuals in game 2 coop-
erate only if individuals in game 1 also cooperate and defect if individuals in
game 2 defect. As the material payo¤s of a single game become arbitrarily small,
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individuals care more about what is going on in their partners game and the
fairness emotions of the players in the single game with small payo¤s is domi-
nated by the fairness emotions of their partners game: players would be kind
if their partners are kind and would be unkind if their partners are unkind.
PROPOSITION 2: If i > 0 and i > 0 for every i 2 N and G(X;Y ) is a
kind-game, there exists a Y for which for all Y 2 (0; Y ) in the sequential group
reciprocity equilibria of G(X;Y ) if the sign of the outcome for G1(X) is strictly
positive then the sign of the outcome for G2(Y ) is strictly positive and if the
sign of the outcome for G1(X) is strictly negative then the sign of the outcome
for G2(Y ) is strictly negative.
Sequential group reciprocity equilibria may explain some outcomes that
other solution concepts cannot. For example, it is possible that a sequential
group reciprocity equilibrium exists where in each PrisonersDilemma in exam-
ple 2 one player plays cooperatewhile the other plays defect.
Player 2 (Daughter of family 2)
Player 1 (Daughter of family1)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4; 1 0; 3=2
Defect 6; 0 1; 1=4
Player 4 (Mother of family 2)
Player 3 (Mother of family 1)
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1; 4 0; 6
Defect 3=2; 0 1=4; 1
Example 2
The payo¤s in example 2 are not symmetrical: in each game one of the play-
ers has the opportunity to o¤set an unkind action carried out by their relative
with a much kinder action. If and i > 0 and i > 0 for every player, a sequen-
tial group reciprocity equilibrium exists where in single game 1, the daughter
of family 1 plays defectand the daughter of family 2 plays cooperate,and
where the mother of the family 1 plays cooperateand the mother of the family
2 plays defect.Even if the daughter of family 1 treats the daughter of family
2 badly, overall she would still think well of family 1 given that the mother of
family 1 is much kinder than her daughter is unkind. In example 2, the outcome
where the sum of the material payo¤s is maximized is one of the sequential group
reciprocity equilibria. We generalize the circumstances in which the outcome
where the sum of the material payo¤s is maximized is a sequential group reci-
procity equilibrium. The basic assumption that make this outcome possible is
that the payo¤s are asymmetric, which means that a player can greatly punish
or reward another player with little cost to herself, and players can be nice to
each other if they choose to be.
In example 3, as the value of X increases, the payo¤s become more asym-
metric. The material payo¤s of one player in each game are based on X, while
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the the material payo¤s of the other player are based on 1=X. Let Q be the
set of games that consists of the set of players N , the set of strategies Ai for
each player i 2 N , and the payo¤ functions (1=X 1 (a1; a2) ; X 2 (a2; a1) ; X 
3 (a3; a4) ; 1=X 4 (a4; a3)) for X > 0. Let Q(X) 2 Q be the game correspond-
ing to a given value of X.
Player 2
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4=X; 4X 0; 6X
Defect 6=X; 0 1=X;X
Game 1
Player 4
Player 3
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4X; 4=X 0; 6=X
Defect 6X; 0 X; 1=X
Game 2
Example 3
We should note that when X grows arbitrarily large in order to reach the
outcome that maximizes the sum of the material payo¤s in a kind-game Q(X),
players 1 and 4 must maximize the material payo¤s of their opponents, whereas
players 3 and 2 must maximize their own material payo¤s and, when indi¤erent,
maximize those of their opponents.
PROPOSITION 3: If Q(X) is a kind-game, i > 0 and i > 0, there exists
an X where for all X > X the outcome that maximizes the sum of the payo¤s
is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium.
Proposition 3 shows that the outcome where the sum of material payo¤s is
maximized is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium as some individuals can
greatly help their opponents without incurring a high cost to themselves. By
doing so, they can o¤set the negative emotions set by those individuals that
earn high material payo¤s by being selsh.
3.2.1 Group Reciprocity over Two Periods
Many interesting situations occur in group interactions when individuals antic-
ipate that the kindness or unkindness of their actions will have an e¤ect on the
behavior of other individuals. For example, a person may be nice to somebody
if she anticipates that their relatives may respond by being nice to her or their
relatives. Similarly, terrorists may commit terrible acts in order to generate neg-
ative emotions among the members of opposing ethnic groups in order to make
these ght each other. In this section, we model how individuals may be kind or
unkind in order to inuence the behavior of other individuals by extending our
model of group fairness to the two-period case where single game 1 is played rst
and then single game 2 and both players in single game 2 observe the outcome
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of single game 1 before they play. If players in single game 1 know that their
actions may a¤ect the outcome of single game 2, they may play di¤erently in
order to inuence the actions of the players in single game 2.
Players in single game 1 maximize their utility in the knowledge that their
actions will a¤ect the actions of players in single game 2. Given that they
want their partners to be treated kindly in game 2, they may be kind in the
rst period in order to make their partners opponent be kind in return, even
if they are treated badly. Huck and Lünser (2010) show that in trust games
individuals help their partners by sharing more in order to create reputation
for their group.2 Abbink and Herrmann (2009) create a Vendetta game where
members of two groups can reciprocate o¤ences against their own groups. They
show that the threat of retaliation decreases the rate of conict.
Proposition 4 shows that when the payo¤s of the composite game are suf-
ciently asymmetric, the sequential group reciprocity equilibria are outcomes
where the sum of the material payo¤s are maximized.
PROPOSITION 4: If Q(X) is a kind-game, i > 0 and i > 0 for every
i 2 N , there exists an X; where for all X > X, the sequential group reciprocity
equilibria in the two period game are outcomes that maximize the sum of the
payo¤s.
As X becomes large and the material payo¤s become more asymmetric, the
emotions of kindness for all players are dominated by the actions of players 1 and
4 (those players that can be very kind or unkind with little cost to themselves).
When single game 1 is played rst, the actions of player 1 determine the outcome
of single game 2. If player 1 is kind in the rst period, player 4 will also be kind
in the second period (in contrast, if player 1 is unkind in the rst period, player
4 will be unkind in the second period). Since the utility of player 1 is higher if
the outcome is positive rather than negative, she will choose to be kind.
Although Proposition 4 appears to contradict the news commonly shown in
the media, Fearon and Laitin (1996) show that interethnic cooperation is far
more common that interethnic conict.
Proposition 4 applies to cases where individuals can help others with a low
cost to themselves and when other members of their group can repay the kind-
ness the most by being kind to their partners. There are many examples in
which friends and relatives of persons with power are often treated nicely in
hope of being repaid by them. And there is ample evidence that individuals
help others in the moments they need it the most even when they can not repay
them in return. In international relations, countries help other countries when
there is a humanitarian disaster. Although this may be due to simple altruism,
it may also be due to a desire to create goodwill that will be returned later to
citizens or rms of the helping country. This is sometimes the case, as some
2Tirole (1996) analyze group reputation as the sum of the reputation of its members and
how, because individuals past behavior is observed only imperfectly, the reputation of a group
is used to estimate the reputation of the members of the group.
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countries give more aid to poor countries with important natural resources in
order to maintain good relations (Lundsgaarde et al. (2010)).
In many instances, individuals that can greatly hurt somebody, may restraint
their actions in order to avoid retaliation against their relatives later. In situa-
tion of asymmetric force, a police o¢ cer may restraint from hurting a member
of a minority, even if provoked, not because he does not want to hurt him, but
because he wants to avoid the violence that this would provoke and may hurt
other members from his own group. For example Ron (2000) shows that the
Israel army restrained their use of force in the Palestinian intifada, in order to
avoid generating more violence.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced the emotions of fairness between groups to game
theory by extending Dufwenberg and Kirchsteigers model of sequential reci-
procity to groups of individuals. We assumed that individuals have emotions of
fairness that include not only the actions played against them, but against other
members of their own group. We dened a new solution concept, which we call
Sequential Group-Reciprocity equilibriumand analyzed how the outcomes of
both games are related.
This approach allows us to develop a theoretical model that explains the
experimental and empirical evidence that shows that individuals reciprocate
not only towards the individuals they are dealing with, but with other members
of the same group. We show that for very asymmetric games (those in which
some players can greatly punish or reward the opposite player with little cost to
themselves) the outcome where the sum of the payo¤s is maximized is a SGRE,
and if the games are played sequentially, the outcome where the sum of the
payo¤s is maximized is the only SGRE, as players in the rst period want their
partners to be treated kindly in period 2, they are kind in order to make their
partners opponent be kind in return.
There are a number of possible extensions to this work. Firstly, in the
real world the majority of interactions are repeated and, therefore, a repeated-
game version of group fairness would bring new and more realistic results. In
international relations, countries build their relations little by little, increasing
their trust through kind actions over time. It is reasonable to think that if an
individual or group of individuals are kind or unkind once and again, the feeling
of kindness or unkindness will grow larger with repeated interactions. It would
be interesting to extend our model by dening a function of kindness that can
increase or decrease over time with the repetition of kind or unkind actions.
Secondly, in this paper we have assumed the value of i (the importance that
a player gives to other members of her group) to be xed. However, Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) show that individuals can, to a certain extent, choose their
identity. If individuals can choose how close they are to the groups to which
they belong, then they may choose their closeness to a group based on the
actions and intentions of the members toward each other and the actions and
16
intentions of other individuals toward the members of the group. For example, if
the members of a family are unkind to each other, we should not expect it to be
as tightly-knit as a family whose members are kind to each other. Furthermore,
it has been observed that the existence of a common enemy tends to increase
the solidarity among the members of a group (Janis (1963)). Extending our
model by endogeneizing the closeness of groups would help to explain many
phenomena, such as the increase in religious fervor and nationalism after wars
or interethnic conicts.
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6 Appendix
Proof of existence
Because in equilibrium aj = bij ; ak = cijk for all j 6= i; k 6= j; we write
Ui (ai(h); (bi`(h)); (ci`k(h))k 6=i)` 6=i) just as Ui (ai(h); (a`(h))` 6=i; (ak(h))k 6=i) :
Note that Ui is a continuos function on a as i; fij ; efijk and the absolute
value are continuos functions: Also note that Ui is a quasi-concave function on
ai as i; fij ; efijk are linear in a and the subtraction of the absolute value is a
concave function and therefore also quasi-concave.
Let Xi(h) be the set of possible actions of player i at history h and let
ai(h) n x be the strategy that is exactly the same as strategy ai; except at
history h; where action x 2 Xi(h) is played.
Let the best response for individual i at history h to be:
i;h(a) = argmaxx2Xi(h) Ui(ai(h) n x; (a`(h))` 6=i; (ak(h))k 6=i)
As Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger we dene the correspondence  as the union
of the best responses of every individual at every history
 =
Q
i2N;h2H
i;h(a)
Given that A is a nonempty, compact, convex space and Ui is continuos in a,
and quasi-concave in ai,  is a nonempty, convex-valued and upper hemicounti-
nous correspondence.
Therefore, we can apply Kakutanis xed point theorem. Hence there exists
a xed point in the best response. This xed point is a Fair Threat Equilibrium
as no player can improve by deviating from this strategy.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
If i and i are positive for every player; as Y becomes arbitrarily large, the
importance of the material payo¤s of single game 2 increases and the recipro-
cal payo¤s of player 1 and 2 are dominated by the outcome of single game 2.
Because G(X;Y ) is a kind game, every player can be kind or unkind, but not
neutral. As the material payo¤s of single game 2 become arbitrarily large and
as they cannot change the material payo¤s of their partners (since they do not
play in the same single game), players 1 and 2 maximize their reciprocal payo¤s
and are going to be kind if players 3 and 4 are kind and they are going to be
unkind if players 3 and 4 are unkind:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
If i and i are positive for every player; as Y becomes arbitrarily small, the
importance of the material payo¤s of single game 2 decreases and the payo¤s
(both material and reciprocal) of player 3 and 4 are are dominated by the
outcome of single game 1. Because G(X;Y ) is a kind game, every player can
be kind or unkind, but not neutral. As the material payo¤s of single game
2 become arbitrarily small and as they cannot change the material payo¤s of
their partners (since the do not play in the same single game), players 3 and 4
maximize their reciprocal payo¤s and are going to be kind if players 1 and 2 are
kind and they are going to be unkind if players 1 and 2 are unkind:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
If i and i are positive for every player;we will show that when X grows
arbitrarily large, in the outcome that maximizes the sum of the material payo¤s
all players play a best response to each other actions.
Note that in the outcome that maximizes the sum of the material payo¤s
when X grows arbitrarily large, players 2 and 3 maximize their own material
payo¤s, and when indi¤erent, they maximize their opponents material payo¤s,
while players 1 and 4 maximize the material payo¤s of their opponents. Also
note that if X grows arbitrarily large in game Q(X); the material payo¤s of
players 2 and 3 dominate their reciprocal payo¤s, while the reciprocal payo¤s
of players 1 and 4 dominate their material payo¤s (as no player can change
the material payo¤s of their partners since they do not play in the same single
game).
Also, if X grows arbitrarily large the payo¤s of players 2 and 3 grow arbi-
trarily large relatively to those of players 1 and 4 and therefore, if players 2 and
3 are treated kindly (by players 1 and 4), not only them, but the other member
of their groups would have kind feelings and would want to be kind in return.
Because in the outcome that maximizes the sum of the payo¤s players 1 and
4 maximize the material payo¤s of their opponents and Q(X) is a kind-game,
both players are kind.
As X grows arbitrarily large, if players 1 and 4 are kind, they are maximiz-
ing their utility by being kind to the players that were kind to their partners,
while players 2 and 3 maximize their utility by maximizing their own material
20
payo¤s. Therefore, every player is playing their best response in the outcome
that maximizes the sum of the material payo¤s.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
If i and i are positive for every player;when X becomes arbitrarily large,
the material payo¤s of players 2 and 3 dominate their reciprocal payo¤s. How-
ever, the actions of player 4 in the second period depend on the actions of player
1 in the rst period. As X becomes arbitrarily large the reciprocal payo¤s dom-
inate the material payo¤s of player 4: If player 1 kind, player 4 is kind and if
player 1 is unkind, player 4 is unkind.
In the rst period, as X becomes arbitrarily large the payo¤s of player 3
dominate the payo¤s of player 1: Given that the payo¤s for player 3 are higher
when player 4 is kind than when is unkind, player 1 is going be kind, in order for
player 4 to be kind in response. This is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium
as all players are maximizing their utility.
Because players 1 and 4 are maximizing their opponents material payo¤s and
players 2 and 3 are maximizing their own material payo¤s, the Group Fairness
Equilibrium of the two period game is the outcome where the sum of the material
payo¤s is maximized.
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